



Journal Of Resource Management, Economics And Business

e-ISSN 2963-0266

<https://portal.xjurnal.com/index.php/REMICS/index>

Volume: 2 Issue: 2 Year: 2026

<https://doi.org/10.58468/remics.v5i2.256>



DIGITAL MATURITY ASSESSMENT AND BUSINESS MODEL TRANSFORMATION IN THE BUSINESS PROCESS OUTSOURCING INDUSTRY

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ABSTRACT

Purpose: This study examines how a digital maturity diagnosis can inform business model transformation in a labour-intensive business process outsourcing (BPO) firm.

Research Methodology: A qualitative single-case study was conducted at PT Karya Solusi Prima Sejahtera. Evidence comprised seven purposively selected informants, corporate documents from 2022–2025, and a DMM-OP-guided interview protocol. Data were analysed through reflexive thematic analysis and a transparent DMM-OP-to-Business Model Canvas (BMC) mapping.

Results: The firm exhibits an early-stage digital maturity profile, marked by siloed operational-financial data, limited ERP utilisation, ad-hoc digital capability development, and restricted cross-firm system integration. These constraints undermine five BMC blocks most directly: value proposition, customer relationships, key activities, key resources, and cost structure. A phased roadmap is proposed to enable a transition from headcount-based staffing to digitally enabled managed services.

Limitations: Findings are bounded to one Indonesian BPO and do not test post-implementation financial effects.

Contribution: The study demonstrates an auditable pathway for using organisational and process maturity evidence to redesign business model elements in people-intensive services.

Keywords: *digital maturity; business model canvas; business process outsourcing; digital transformation; managed services; Indonesia.*



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1. INTRODUCTION

Digital transformation has shifted from a back-office technology concern to a strategic capability that reshapes how organisations create, deliver, and capture value (Bharadwaj et al.,

Journal Of Resource Management, Economics And Business (REMICS) | 2026

2013; Vial, 2019; Verhoef et al., 2021). The shift is particularly consequential for business process outsourcing (BPO), where labour-intensive service delivery can create revenue growth without corresponding margin improvement. In Indonesia, conventional staffing and manpower-supply arrangements remain exposed to price competition, high client bargaining power, and cost structures that scale linearly with headcount.

PT Karya Solusi Prima Sejahtera (KSPS) presents such a strategic puzzle. Company documents indicate that revenue increased from Rp143.1 billion in 2022 to Rp198.2 billion in 2025, while gross profit moved only from Rp27.03 billion to Rp27.45 billion during the same period. The company's business remains heavily concentrated in conventional BPO services, while operational reporting, attendance, payroll-related coordination, and project-margin monitoring are distributed across disconnected systems and spreadsheets. These conditions make it difficult to detect cost overruns promptly and to offer higher-value, outcome-based services.

Prior studies have examined digital maturity as a readiness or capability assessment, and business model innovation as a mechanism for renewing value logic. Yet the two streams are commonly treated as separate workstreams. Digital maturity studies often stop after identifying capability levels, whereas BMC studies frequently propose future value configurations without specifying whether the underlying organisational and process capabilities can support them. This gap is material in people-intensive BPO: a digitally ambitious business model cannot be implemented when data governance, employee capability, process integration, and technology utilisation remain immature.

Accordingly, this article does not treat DMM-OP scores as a stand-alone index. It uses DMM-OP evidence to identify concrete design constraints for the nine BMC blocks. The novelty lies in the transparent analytical bridge: each maturity dimension is linked to the business model element it constrains, the observed evidence, and the feasible transformation response. The study addresses two research questions: RQ1: What organisational and process digital-maturity constraints shape the current BPO business model? RQ2: How can these constraints be translated into a sequenced digital business model transformation?

The remainder of the article first reviews digital maturity and business model transformation, then explains the single-case methodology. The results report the maturity profile and the DMM-OP-to-BMC mapping. The discussion develops the contribution and an implementation roadmap, followed by conclusions, limitations, and future research directions.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL PROPOSITIONS

2.1 Digital maturity as an organisational and process capability

Digital maturity refers to an organisation's ability to mobilise digital technologies, data, processes, and people in ways that support strategic value creation. Technology acquisition alone is insufficient; digital strategy, culture, data governance, competence, and inter-organisational integration determine whether digital investment becomes a scalable organisational capability (Kane et al., 2015; Verhoef et al., 2021).

The Digital Maturity Model for Organisational and Process Dimensions (DMM-OP) is relevant because it distinguishes organisational dimensions—digital strategy, culture, data management, and cybersecurity—from process dimensions—performance management, process management, business partners, employee support, employee behaviour, competency

development, and technological support (Tubis, 2023; Tubis et al., 2024). This distinction prevents an ERP installation or isolated automation from being mistaken for enterprise-wide transformation.

For the present study, a maturity level is not inferred from a numerical average. Each dimension is assigned a final evidence-based level after cross-checking interview accounts and corporate documents against the DMM-OP descriptors. Where sources reveal uneven practices, the lower evidenced level is retained to avoid overstating maturity.

This evidence-based interpretation is important in service firms. Digital maturity may vary sharply between formal systems and everyday practice. A firm can, for example, procure an ERP platform while supervisors continue to prepare operational and financial reports in parallel spreadsheets. In that situation, the installed platform is evidence of an initiative, but not evidence that the organisation has achieved integrated data management or process maturity. The unit of assessment must therefore be the enacted capability, not the availability of a particular technology.

The organisational/process distinction also informs transformation sequencing. Organisational dimensions create the governance conditions for change, including strategic direction, cultural acceptance, skills, and safeguards. Process dimensions show whether these conditions are embedded in operational routines and ecosystem relationships. A BPO firm seeking to sell an integrated client dashboard, for instance, must first be able to generate reliable internal data, define ownership of client information, and protect cross-firm access. The resulting maturity diagnosis is consequently a boundary condition for strategic design, rather than a generic ranking of digital sophistication.

2.2 Business model transformation in BPO

A business model explains the logic through which a firm creates, delivers, and captures value. The BMC operationalises this logic through customer segments, value propositions, channels, customer relationships, revenue streams, key resources, key activities, key partners, and cost structure (Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2010). Business model innovation is more than adding technology: it entails a coordinated change to value creation and capture (Foss & Saebi, 2017).

In BPO, a headcount-based model primarily monetises labour volume. A managed-services model, by contrast, can use service-level agreements, integrated reporting, process optimisation, and digital quality assurance to price outcomes rather than merely labour inputs. Robotic process automation and analytics may support this transition, but only when governance, data reliability, employee capabilities, and cybersecurity are sufficiently developed (Willcocks et al., 2017).

This study therefore advances two qualitative propositions. P1: Low maturity in organisational and process dimensions constrains the scalability of the existing BPO business model. P2: A viable digital BMC must sequence business-model changes according to the maturity constraints evidenced in the focal firm.

The BMC is particularly useful in this setting because it exposes the interdependence of the model's elements. A new client portal, for example, affects channels and customer relationships, but it also depends on key resources (data and technology), key activities (data validation and reporting), key partners (cloud or systems integrators), and cost structure (software and

security investment). This interdependence means that an attractive value proposition cannot be assessed independently of the firm's operational readiness.

The present research is not a test of causal hypotheses. The propositions serve as sensitising statements that organise a qualitative inquiry and make the expected analytical relationship explicit. The empirical task is to assess whether case evidence supports the claimed constraint mechanism, identify its limits, and formulate a context-sensitive response.

The distinction between a diagnostic and a prescription is central to this study. DMM-OP diagnoses the present configuration of capabilities; it does not supply a universal business model. The BMC, in turn, makes visible the choices through which a firm creates and captures value; it does not guarantee that those choices are executable. Combining the two frameworks enables the analysis to move from 'what is weak' to 'what business-model choice is currently infeasible, why it is infeasible, and what capability must be strengthened first'. This is the specific analytical gap addressed by the article.

The approach is useful beyond the focal case because many service firms face a similar temptation to copy visible digital initiatives from larger competitors. A portal, AI application, or partner-integration programme may have strategic appeal but can fail when the firm has not resolved data ownership, process variation, employee skills, or information-security obligations. The proposed bridge is therefore deliberately conservative: it prioritises capability evidence and implementation sequence over aspirational technology claims.

3. METHOD

3.1 Research design and case context

This research employed a qualitative single-case study because it investigates how digital capability constraints and business-model configuration interact in a real organisational setting. KSPS was selected purposively because it is an Indonesian BPO provider with more than 1,700 managed workers, measurable revenue growth, and persistent margin pressure. The case is information-rich for examining the transition from conventional manpower supply to digitally enabled managed services.

The unit of analysis is the firm-level business model. The temporal scope of documentary evidence is 2022–2025, while interviews were conducted in 2026. The study received organisational permission to access non-public operational and financial materials. Informants were told the study purpose, participation was voluntary, and results are reported with anonymised codes.

3.2 Informants and data sources

Seven—not eight—informants were included. The correction reflects the final verified dataset: four internal decision makers, two external partners, and one independent industry expert. This composition enabled triangulation across the firm, its market interface, and industry practice.

Table 1: Informant Profile

Code	Role and stakeholder cluster			Primary analytical contribution		
I-1	Chief Executive Officer;	Corporate	strategy,	customer	concentration,	

Code	Role and stakeholder cluster	Primary analytical contribution
	internal corporate informant	revenue logic, and transformation priorities.
I-2	Operations Manager; internal corporate informant	Service workflow, field coordination, performance reporting, and process bottlenecks.
I-3	IT Supervisor; internal corporate informant	ERP configuration, system utilisation, integration constraints, and cybersecurity practice.
I-4	VP of Finance; internal corporate informant	Project-margin monitoring, financial data flow, cost structure, and cash-flow visibility.
E-1	Primary telecommunications client; external partner	Client reporting expectations, service quality, and digital relationship requirements.
E-2	Systems-integration vendor; external partner	Technical feasibility of ERP, data pipelines, cloud migration, and systems integration.
A-1	Senior global BPO practitioner/GM of IT; industry expert	Industry benchmark, managed-services logic, and organisational barriers to adoption.

Source: Research design and primary data (2026).

3.3 Data collection and analytical procedure

Primary data were collected through semi-structured, in-depth interviews. The interview protocol was derived from the eleven DMM-OP dimensions and the nine BMC blocks. Interviews addressed current work practices, systems used, data flow, decision rights, employee competence, partner integration, value proposition, revenue logic, and perceived transformation priorities. Interviews were recorded with permission and transcribed verbatim.

Secondary evidence comprised audited or management financial summaries for 2022–2025, strategic plans, standard operating procedures, organisation charts, company profiles, ERP utilisation records where available, and service-reporting materials. Documentary materials were used to verify contextual claims rather than to create an independent quantitative maturity score.

Analysis followed reflexive thematic analysis: familiarisation, initial coding, candidate-theme development, theme review, definition/naming, and reporting (Braun & Clarke, 2017, 2021). The initial coding frame was deductive, based on DMM-OP and BMC; inductive codes were retained when data pointed to contextual mechanisms such as founder dependency, off-system execution, or managerial resistance. A coding memo recorded the evidence source, code, theme, maturity descriptor, affected BMC block, and analytic decision.

The analysis proceeded iteratively. First, each transcript and document was assigned a source code. Second, passages were coded for observed practice rather than for desired future state. Third, codes were compared across stakeholder clusters. For example, an assertion that a client-facing dashboard could be introduced was not treated as evidence of existing partner integration; it was treated as a future-oriented suggestion until supported by documentation of

a functioning data pipeline. This distinction reduced the risk of conflating recommendations with current capability.

Fourth, the researchers produced a case matrix in which each DMM-OP dimension was linked to supporting evidence, contradictory evidence, and a provisional level. The provisional levels were reviewed against the DMM-OP descriptors. Finally, the confirmed constraint was mapped to one or more BMC blocks. The BMC mapping was retained only where the mechanism could be stated explicitly; broad or unsupported links were excluded.

Table 2: Evidence-to-Theme and Maturity-Decision Protocol

Analytical step	Procedure	Output
1. Familiarisation	Read transcripts and documents repeatedly; prepare case and timeline memos.	Initial case narrative and evidence inventory.
2. Initial coding	Code statements against DMM-OP dimensions and BMC blocks; retain contextual codes.	Code list, including data silos, manual double handling, ERP underutilisation, and accountability resistance.
3. Triangulation	Compare internal accounts with client/vendor/expert accounts and documents.	Convergent, divergent, and unverified claims identified.
4. Maturity decision	Match convergent evidence to DMM-OP descriptors. When evidence differed by unit, retain the lower evidenced level.	One final level per DMM-OP dimension; no arithmetic "cumulative index".
5. BMC mapping	Map each final maturity constraint to the directly affected BMC block(s), then develop a feasible response.	Constraint-to-BMC matrix and phased roadmap.
6. Trustworthiness	Conduct member confirmation of factual case descriptions; maintain an audit trail of transcripts, coding memos, and document references.	Credibility, dependability, and confirmability record.

Source: Adapted from Braun and Clarke (2017, 2021) and Tubis (2023).

3.4 Trustworthiness

Credibility was supported through source triangulation across internal, external, and expert informants and through comparison with corporate documents. A factual case summary and the preliminary maturity profile were returned to internal participants for member confirmation; feedback was used to clarify factual descriptions, not to suppress divergent interpretations. Transferability is supported by a detailed description of the BPO setting, while dependability and confirmability are supported by the coding memo and audit trail.

The study does not claim statistical generalisation. Instead, it seeks analytical transferability: readers may assess whether the maturity constraints and BMC mapping are relevant to comparable labour-intensive service firms.

Several safeguards were used to distinguish evidence from inference. First, claims about current systems and work practices were tagged by source type. Second, financial figures were reported only at the aggregate level permitted by the company and were not used to calculate an econometric effect. Third, future-state recommendations were labelled as proposed actions and separated from results tables. Fourth, the external client and vendor perspectives were used to challenge internal narratives about service expectations and technical readiness. These safeguards improve the auditability of the case while recognising the interpretive nature of qualitative analysis.

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Current business model and financial paradox

The baseline BMC is dominated by a conventional manpower-supply logic. Customer segments are concentrated in large telecommunications corporations, which account for approximately 80–90% of revenue. The value proposition focuses on staffing availability, payroll compliance, and administrative coordination. Revenue is largely generated through monthly recurring charges calculated per deployed headcount, while costs are dominated by direct wages and manually coordinated administration.

This configuration explains why revenue growth is not automatically converted into improved profit. The financial documents show growing revenue but nearly flat gross profit. The evidence does not establish a causal effect of any single digital gap on financial performance; rather, it shows a plausible operational mechanism. Manual double handling and fragmented data make project-level cost and margin visibility slower and less reliable, limiting the firm's ability to identify loss-making work, redesign processes, or price higher-value outcomes.

The case further indicates that the commercial model and operating model reinforce each other. A headcount-priced contract rewards deployment volume and administrative reliability, but offers limited incentive to invest in reusable digital assets. Conversely, investment in a platform or analytics capability is difficult to justify when the firm cannot observe unit economics accurately or recover investment through outcome-based pricing. This reciprocal relationship helps explain why isolated technology adoption has not shifted the company's overall business logic.

The baseline model should not be read as ineffective in all respects. It has produced revenue growth and sustained client relationships. The issue is strategic fit under conditions of growing complexity and rising client expectations. The transformation challenge is therefore to preserve strengths in workforce deployment and relationship knowledge while replacing opaque manual coordination with a more observable, standardised, and value-based service architecture.

Table 3: Baseline Business Model Vulnerabilities

BMC block	Observed baseline logic	Strategic vulnerability
Customer segments	Predominantly captive telecommunications accounts.	Revenue concentration and weak diversification.

BMC block	Observed baseline logic	Strategic vulnerability
Value proposition	Labour supply, payroll compliance, and administrative support.	Commodity positioning and limited differentiation.
Channels and relationships	Personal networks and reactive account management; no integrated CRM.	Founder dependency and limited proactive retention management.
Revenue streams	Monthly recurring charge per headcount.	Margin tied to labour volume rather than service outcomes.
Resources and activities	Recruitment databases, manual coordination, attendance and payroll administration.	Limited proprietary digital capability and high administrative burden.
Partners and costs	Tactical technology partnerships; wage-heavy cost base.	Restricted ecosystem integration and linear cost scaling.

Source: Primary data analysis (2026).

4.2 Digital maturity profile

The evidence positions KSPS at an early transition stage: digital tools are present, but they are not yet integrated into a coherent business strategy or end-to-end operating architecture. Table 4 reports one final level for each dimension. These levels are qualitative assessments based on the protocol in Table 2 and should not be interpreted as a numerical index.

Table 4: DMM-OP Digital Maturity Profile of PT KSPS

Dimension	Final level	Triangulated evidence	Implication
Digital strategy	Level 2— Discovery	IT is mainly viewed as administrative support; digital initiatives are not consistently linked to business-model priorities.	Transformation lacks portfolio governance and executive ownership.
Digital culture	Level 1— Basic	Manual practices persist; transparency and accountability concerns inhibit adoption.	Technology adoption remains compliance-oriented rather than value-oriented.
Data management	Level 1— Basic	Operational and financial data are fragmented; strategic	No reliable single source of truth for project-margin

Dimension	Final level	Triangulated evidence	Implication
		decisions use incomplete or delayed information.	decisions.
Cybersecurity	Level 2— Discovery	Baseline protection and backup practices are emerging, but cross-enterprise integration controls are not mature.	External data integration should be sequenced after security strengthening.
Performance management	Level 2— Discovery	Contract reporting exists, yet reporting requires manual consolidation and repeated data entry.	Metrics are retrospective and labour intensive.
Process management	Level 2— Discovery	Automation is localised; end-to-end client workflows are not integrated.	Process scalability remains limited.
Business partners	Level 1— Basic	Vendor relationships are tactical; automated data exchange with partners is absent.	Ecosystem-based services cannot yet be reliably delivered.
Employee support	Level 2— Discovery	Some data access is available, but tools are local, static, and siloed.	Employees cannot consistently collaborate using current data.
Employee behaviour	Level 2— Discovery	Front-line readiness is evident, but sustained adoption is constrained by managerial resistance.	Change management must target leadership as well as users.
Competency development	Level 1— Basic	Training is ad hoc and software-specific; there is no data-literacy blueprint.	Digital capability cannot be scaled systematically.
Technological support	Level 2— Discovery	Odoo is installed, but key financial and project-monitoring functions remain off-system.	ERP investment does not yet generate integrated decision support.

Source: Primary data analysis using DMM-OP descriptors (2026).

4.3 From maturity constraints to business model transformation

The central finding is not simply that KSPS has “low digital maturity.” The more precise finding is that particular maturity constraints restrict particular business-model choices. For example, fragmented data management and partial ERP use constrain cost structure, key activities, and revenue logic because project profitability cannot be reliably monitored in real

time. Likewise, immature partner integration and cybersecurity limit the credibility of a client-facing portal or open ecosystem dashboard.

Table 5 makes this analytical bridge explicit. It also prevents an over-ambitious redesign: the proposed Digital BMC is a sequenced target state, not an immediate prescription. High-risk, client-facing, AI-enabled, or cross-enterprise capabilities should be pursued only after core data, ERP, competence, and security conditions are strengthened.

Table 5: DMM-OP Constraints and BMC Redesign Responses

Maturity constraint	Affected BMC block(s)	Design response	Sequencing logic
Siloed operational-financial data; off-system margin calculations	Key activities; cost structure; revenue streams	Integrate project, payroll, cost, and cash-flow records in ERP; establish project-margin dashboard.	Foundation: required before outcome-based pricing can be governed.
IT positioned as administrative support	Key resources; key activities; value proposition	Create executive digital-governance role and transformation portfolio.	Foundation: aligns technology investment to service strategy.
Ad-hoc data literacy and change resistance	Key resources; key activities; customer relationships	Create competency matrix, leadership change plan, and role-based training.	Foundation: supports adoption and accountable use of data.
Localised process automation	Value proposition; key activities; cost structure	Standardise priority workflows and automate repeatable reporting/quality checks.	Transition: enables measurable service-level commitments.
No integrated CRM or client visibility	Channels; customer relationships; value proposition	Deploy digital CRM and client performance dashboard after data quality improves.	Transition: improves proactive retention and reporting.
Low partner integration and emerging cybersecurity	Key partners; channels; customer relationships	Adopt API/data-pipeline governance, vendor agreements, access control, and encryption.	Transition/scale-up: required before external systems are connected.
No proprietary analytics capability	Key resources; value proposition; revenue streams	Develop analytics use cases for recruitment matching, demand forecasting, and quality assurance.	Scale-up: contingent on validated data and governance.

Source: Authors' synthesis from primary data, DMM-OP, and BMC analysis (2026).

4.4 Discussion

The findings extend digital transformation research by showing that digital maturity should be used as a business-model feasibility diagnostic rather than as a descriptive scorecard. Consistent with Verhoef et al. (2021) and Vial (2019), the limiting factors are not confined to technology. Strategy, culture, data, competence, and partner arrangements determine whether digital tools can change how the firm creates and captures value. The KSPS case is especially instructive because Odoo ERP adoption created an appearance of progress while essential financial and operational decisions remained off-system.

The study also extends the DMM-OP application from the logistics-oriented contexts emphasised by Tubis (2023) and Tubis et al. (2024) to a labour-intensive BPO setting. The evidence supports P1: early-stage organisational and process maturity constrains the scalability of the BPO model. However, the case does not show that digitalisation itself will automatically improve margin. Margin improvement requires a coordinated change in service design, pricing, operational governance, and client relationship management.

The findings support P2 by demonstrating a staged pathway. In Horizon 1, KSPS should resolve core ERP utilisation, data governance, role clarity, and competency development. In Horizon 2, it can standardise workflows, introduce digital CRM, and pilot managed-service contracts with clearly measurable service-level agreements. Horizon 3 can explore advanced analytics and AI-supported recruitment or quality assurance, subject to data quality, legal compliance, cybersecurity, and human oversight. The road map is therefore a feasibility sequence rather than a deterministic financial forecast.

For BPO managers, the implication is practical: replacing manual routines with isolated digital tools is insufficient. Leadership should first establish a single source of truth for project economics and create accountability for adoption. Only then should the firm market digitally enabled managed services. For researchers, the constraint-to-BMC matrix offers a replicable analytical device for studying how organisational readiness conditions business model innovation.

An additional theoretical implication concerns the direction of explanation. Many digital-transformation accounts treat firm performance as a downstream result of technology adoption. This case suggests a more conditional explanation: technology affects the economic logic of a BPO only when it becomes embedded in decision rights, data governance, process standards, and contract design. The observed margin paradox is therefore not resolved by adding automation alone. It requires an organisational mechanism that makes cost, quality, and service outcomes visible and governable.

The roadmap also addresses the risk of premature AI adoption. AI-enabled screening, demand prediction, or automated quality assurance may be relevant future applications, but such tools depend on lawful, representative, and reliable data. Their use should be preceded by clear human-review procedures, access controls, model-performance monitoring, and a defensible purpose. In the present case, AI is consequently positioned in the scale-up horizon rather than being used as a substitute for foundational data and process work.

The case has implications for client relationships as well. Greater transparency may improve retention because clients receive timely, consistent service-performance information. Yet it can also expose variation in field performance and create new expectations for response time, data accuracy, and information security. A client dashboard should thus be framed as a jointly

governed service feature with agreed indicators, escalation procedures, and access rights—not merely as a technology product.

The proposed design also clarifies the role of pricing. A shift from per-headcount charges to outcome-based or SLA-linked charges should not be introduced as a blanket replacement. The firm first needs a transparent method to define service outcomes, attribute cost, agree acceptable measurement, and manage exceptions with clients. In practice, a pilot contract can operate alongside existing staffing contracts while the firm learns whether quality, cycle-time, or compliance indicators are sufficiently stable for commercial use. This approach reduces the risk that a new pricing label simply transfers operational uncertainty to either the client or the provider.

Finally, the transformation should maintain a human-centred perspective. BPO work involves employees deployed across client sites, supervisors with local knowledge, and clients with sector-specific compliance requirements. Standardisation and automation can reduce avoidable manual work, but they should not erase discretionary judgment where service recovery, employee welfare, or client context requires it. The data-literacy and change-management programme should therefore include communication, role redesign, escalation pathways, and mechanisms for frontline feedback.

4.5 Phased transformation roadmap

Table 6: Three-Horizon Transformation Roadmap

Horizon	Priority actions	Decision indicators
Horizon Foundation (Year 1)	1: Reposition IT as a strategic partner; configure ERP financial and HRIS functions; establish data governance and project-margin reporting; develop competency matrix and change-management plan.	Share of priority project-finance transactions processed in ERP; data-quality exceptions; training completion; availability of reconciled project-margin reports.
Horizon Service transition (Years 2–3)	2: Standardise high-volume workflows; deploy CRM and client performance reporting; pilot SLA-based managed services; establish secure partner-integration standards.	Cycle time and rework in selected workflows; client dashboard adoption; SLA attainment; pilot-client retention and contribution margin.
Horizon 3: Scale-up (Years 4–5)	Deploy governed analytics/AI use cases; expand to sectors with suitable risk profile; strengthen cloud and cybersecurity controls; productise proven managed-service offerings.	Validated model performance; security audit outcomes; share of revenue from outcome-based services; administrative cost per managed worker.

Source: Authors' synthesis (2026). The indicators are proposed monitoring measures, not achieved results.

5. CONCLUSION

This study investigated how a digital maturity assessment can guide business model transformation in an Indonesian BPO firm. KSPS exhibits an early transition profile rather than an integrated digital operating model. The principal constraints are siloed data, incomplete ERP utilisation, low digital-culture and competency maturity, limited partner integration, and emerging—not integrated—cybersecurity capabilities.

The article's contribution is a transparent DMM-OP-to-BMC mapping. Rather than asserting that digital maturity directly raises profit, it identifies how specific maturity gaps restrict value proposition, customer relationships, key activities, resources, partnerships, revenue logic, and cost structure. The proposed Digital BMC therefore moves in stages from headcount-based staffing toward digitally enabled managed services.

The study is limited by its single-case design, seven informants, and absence of post-implementation performance data. Future research should use longitudinal designs to evaluate whether the roadmap changes project-margin visibility, client retention, operating costs, and the share of outcome-based revenue. Comparative cases across BPO firms and quantitative tests of client-side technology readiness, regulatory conditions, and workforce capability would further refine the framework.

The findings should also be interpreted with caution because maturity descriptions are context dependent. A Level 2 capability in one function may coexist with more advanced practice in a limited project or client account. The assessment deliberately reports the level that is evidenced as repeatable at the organisational level rather than the most advanced isolated practice. In addition, the analysis does not quantify the investment required for each roadmap action, nor does it evaluate labour-market or data-protection regulation in detail. These issues should be addressed before any implementation decision.

Future studies should also report implementation failure, unintended effects, and employee experience alongside commercial indicators. Such evidence would clarify when a digital BMC improves resilience and service quality, and when a conventional or hybrid operating model remains the more appropriate strategic choice.

Cross-sector comparison with logistics, customer-contact centres, and other outsourced services would further test the portability of the constraint-to-BMC mapping and identify sector-specific maturity thresholds.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The authors thank the management and staff of PT Karya Solusi Prima Sejahtera for research access and the informants for their time. The authors retain responsibility for the analysis and interpretation.

DECLARATION ON THE USE OF AI-ASSISTED TECHNOLOGIES

ChatGPT (OpenAI) was used for language editing and structural refinement during manuscript preparation. It was not used to generate the research data, conduct interviews, or produce the analytical findings. The authors reviewed and verified all AI-assisted text, tables, references, and interpretations and remain fully responsible for the accuracy, originality, and integrity of this manuscript.

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